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ABSTRACT: As the COVID-19 pandemic tore through the globe, policymakers grappled with 
two key questions. First, to what extent could new tools to collect and analyze data on a massive 
scale help limit the virus’s spread and, second, how would the collection of that data impact the 
privacy rights of individuals? This paper examines both questions and reveals how nation-specific 
traditions, values, and leaders shaped the delicate balance between the right to privacy and the 
protection of the population from COVID-19. An exploration of the surveillance techniques 
developed in response to the SARS and HIV pandemics reveals the growing consensus around 
the importance of accurate data collection and analysis. Next, this paper examines the COVID-19 
response in 6 areas (China, South Korea, Singapore, Israel, the United States, and the European 
Union) to demonstrate the diverse array of responses to the pandemic. Different attitudes toward 
privacy and government control in each country led to dramatically different outcomes. Finally, 
this paper examines the role of regime type, leadership, experience with pandemics, and privacy 
norms in a comparison between China and the United Kingdom. This paper concludes by arguing 
that the balance between privacy and health can be successfully maintained by ensuring 
government transparency, reasonable scope and duration of implemented measures, and 
optimized use of technology to reduce excess data collection.  
 
 
Section I: Introduction  
As COVID-19 spread throughout the world, causing shutdowns and disruptions to modern 
society on an unprecedented scale, the threat of pandemics became painfully clear. The failure of 
governments and international organizations to prevent and mitigate the dangers of a global 
pandemic such as COVID-19 has left many desperate for the creation of new policies, norms, 
and infrastructure. The scientific community, alongside policy experts, demands the utilization of 
data that are mass collected in the 21st century to respond to pandemics. While this may be 
effective, if not vital, in the fight against COVID-19, one would be remiss to ignore the privacy 
implications of tracking the disease and its human carriers.  
This paper will examine the privacy implications and efficacy of a data-driven tracking 
approach, with its scope limited to the first six months (March through August 2020) of the 
pandemic. Focusing on the early months of the pandemic provides insight into governments’ 
immediate responses, and allows investigation into policymakers’ first instincts when they are 
faced with crises. This paper also contains two sections of cross-country comparison; the first 
1
Miller: A Global Investigation of Privacy Issues in the Age of COVID-19
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
Jessie Miller 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 2 
 Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021  
24 
details the strategy, efficacy, and privacy implications of pandemic response from a diverse 
subset of nations, while the second explores how regime type and leadership impacted nations’ 
pandemic response in China and the United Kingdom.     
 
Section II: A Fundamental Review of Relevant International Pandemic Response Policy  
Recent history lends an important perspective on the pandemic response. With our 
technological capabilities increasing at breakneck speed, pandemics such as Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) provide the most applicable insight into technologically-
assisted responses to pandemics, as governments’ utilized digitally-assisted tracking systems and 
developed surveillance databases. SARS is relevant to study because it, like COVID-19, is 
caused by a coronavirus. Reflecting on the response to HIV/AIDS is also of interest because, as 
will be further discussed below, it had the most significant privacy implications of any recent 
pandemic or epidemic.   
SARS is often referred to as the first pandemic of the 21st century. The disease is thought 
to have first emerged in the Chinese province of Guangdong and quickly spread throughout 
many countries, killing hundreds. Knowledge of the disease spread internationally when the 
World Health Organization (WHO) sent out a worldwide alert on March 12, 2003, describing a 
“severe respiratory illness of undetermined cause that was rapidly spreading among hospital staff 
in Hong Kong.”1 Within months, many nations implemented new policies and responses to 
combat the spread.  
One common approach included setting up measures to track persons who were 
suspected to be infected. For example, the United States implemented a tracking system in an 
attempt to contain the spread. Soon after the WHO announcement on March 12th, 2002, the 
United States developed a case form to track and collect demographic data about the spread. 
Healthcare providers were requested (though not required) to report all suspected cases of SARS 
to the CDC and data on possible carriers was collected and added to a national “line list.” It is 
unclear whether patient permission was expressly requested before personal information was 
added to the list. This method of tracing was technologically limited in the sense that the 
collection of information was paper-based, though the CDC did keep epidemiologic data in an 
electronic database.2 To evaluate the effectiveness of such a response, it is helpful to analyze the 
surveillance system sensitivity, which is the measurement of the proportion SARS found through 
the surveillance system implemented in the United States. Since there were eight confirmed 
SARS cases, and all had been identified as “probable cases,” the sensitivity was an impressive 
100%.3 
Canada took a similar approach to combating SARS. The nation created a SARS hotline 
which was tasked with identifying potential SARS cases and contacts of infected individuals. 
People voluntarily called the line to report symptoms and exposure to SARS, and to ask 
questions about the disease. Additionally, a case reporting telephone system was developed to 
help hospitals report cases with ease. Furthermore, a Case Management team was established to 
investigate reports of potential SARS cases and determine if they met the criterion to be 
classified as a suspect case. Through these methods, Canada conducted 2,000 case investigations, 
identified 23,300 possible contacts, and placed 13,374 individuals in quarantine.4 This method 
was relatively effective, since the outbreak was able to be contained within populations such as 
hospital staff, patients and their visitors, and household members of known cases.5  
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Other countries opted to go beyond reporting and tracing to screening individuals in 
public places and at points of travel in ways that had little cause for privacy concerns. For 
example, in Singapore, many public buildings, offices, and residential spaces required a 
temperature check upon entry.6 At Singapore’s Changi Airport, travelers were met with infrared 
scanners that screened body temperature; Hong Kong, China, the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Taiwan also followed suit in screening passengers’ temperatures.7 The screenings do not appear 
to have been recorded, added to any database, or shared among any nations. Accordingly, such 
airport screenings did not result in any accusations of privacy invasion. The screenings appear to 
be moderately effective. Before the implementation of screening policies, transmission of the 
disease occurred on five flights that infected individuals onboard. After its implementation, 
which was recommended by WHO in March 2003, no additional flight transmissions were 
identified.8 
The myriad of international SARS policies raised many questions about the legality and 
rights implications of health surveillance. Tracking an individual’s contacts, movements, and 
health data in the name of public health posed threats to privacy. Individuals’ health data is 
widely considered sensitive information, and is treated with an expectation of confidentiality. 
Furthermore, in the haste to respond swiftly to the threat of SARS, legal professionals and courts 
had little say in the health policies and mitigation efforts of their respective nations. A legal 
review undertaken by Leslie Jacobs of York University examined legal consciousness during 
SARS in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Toronto. Jacobs found that legal actors such as judges and 
lawyers were uninvolved in the public health efforts to reduce the spread of SARS.9 The 
exclusion of legal actors was problematic because the very parties that are tasked with the 
protection of and advocacy for rights were cut off from forming responses that had rights 
implications.  
The response policies’ disconnect with legal considerations disregarded the priorities and 
concerns of many citizens. A survey conducted by Shanghai Academy of the Social Sciences as 
part of the Asia Pacific Dispute Resolution Project shows that individuals in Singapore and 
Toronto did not approve of their governments disregarding rights during times of health crisis.10 
Of the approximately 200 Toronto residents who were surveyed, only 19% of respondents gave 
the highest importance to the government having the right to do whatever it judged necessary to 
prevent the spread of the disease. This shows that individuals are not willing or comfortable with 
sacrificing their privacy and freedom of movement in the name of public health. 
Furthermore, a survey taken by 634 residents of Singapore reflects concerns about their 
government’s response to the pandemic in terms of privacy violations. Almost two-thirds of 
respondents protested against the broadcast of names to the public of those who were under 
quarantine orders, and 33.1% of the total respondents were against the hypothetical installation 
of web cameras and tag surveillance of those under home quarantine orders. In the case of public 
health responses aimed at preventing the spread of SARS, there is clear evidence of privacy 
concerns. 
Similar concerns about the right to privacy concerns emerged during the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. Many of the first recognized cases of AIDS emerged in 1981 in the United States, 
though the virus soon spread globally. Transmitted through sexual contact, blood contamination, 
needles, and from mothers to infants, tracking carriers of the disease quickly was a common 
policy. However, challenged by privacy concerns and the stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS 
infections, nations faced a struggle between protecting the confidentiality of infected individuals 
while also effectively preventing the spread of the disease. Some nations prioritized prevention 
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over confidentiality, using name-based tracking of infected individuals. Other countries were 
more conscientious of privacy concerns, and developed alternative tracking measures that 
protected infected individuals’ identities to varying degrees. It is imperative to recognize that 
homophobia and a lack of information about HIV/AIDS shaped both policy design and outcome.  
One of the nations that is well known for robust HIV/AIDS surveillance is Cuba. 
Favoring prevention over confidentiality, Cuba developed strong testing and tracking measures. 
For example, by February 1988, Cuba had the capacity to test 25% of its sexually-active 
population; this was accomplished through mandatory testing of blood donors, pregnant women, 
those with other sexually transmitted infections, all hospital admissions, and sexual contacts of 
infected individuals.11 Tracing and notifying the sexual contacts of individuals who have tested 
positive was a controversial aspect of Cuba’s HIV/AIDS policy. Many concerns about protecting 
infected individual’s identities to protect them from social stigmatization arose. Although Cuba 
has faced criticism for its response, as it violated the privacy of infected persons and endangered 
their safety, the country has touted the effectiveness of its HIV/AIDS policy. As of 2008, Cuba 
claimed the highest level of AIDS treatment and the lowest rate of HIV infection out of the entire 
Caribbean region.12 
 Other countries worked to find alternative, less invasive, methods of tracking the disease 
and its carriers. Two such countries were Canada and (within certain states) the United States. 
Canada implemented a compulsory case reporting system in which medical providers entered 
information on their patient’s birth dates, gender, and risk behaviors into a database that was 
maintained by the Massachusetts General Hospital Utility Multi-Programming System 
(MUMPS). This was done in an effort to provide some measure of protection for infected 
patients’ identities, while also enabling public health officials to identify trends such as higher 
HIV rates among injection drug users and native British Columbians.13 
Both Maryland and Texas took initiative and separately attempted to develop their own 
state surveillance systems that utilized non-name unique identifiers (UI) in the early 1990s. The 
UI codes were comprised of the last four digits of the patient's Social Security number, six-digit 
date of birth, one-digit code for race/ethnicity, and one-digit code for sex.14 These codes were 
then entered into a surveillance database, which the CDC planned to later evaluate. Although 
there was cooperation between state and federal authorities, the UI systems in Maryland and 
Texas were developed as a result of the states’ own prerogatives. Unfortunately, these systems 
faced problems such as attaining the data elements to construct a UI (e.g. failing to collect Social 
Security Numbers) and the issue of duplicate tests interfering with the accuracy of collected 
data.15 The UI system also made it difficult to follow-up with those who had tested positive; only 
60% of reports could later be matched to client records.16 As a result, Maryland and Texas 
deemed the system to be “unworkable” and abandoned it in favor of name-based reporting.17 
 In light of the failed attempts made by Maryland and Texas to adopt a UI system, many 
states overlooked confidentiality concerns and adopted name-based tracking systems. In fact, 31 
states were conducting name-based HIV surveillance as of January 1998.18 This was bolstered by 
a 1999 policy by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) that required states to adopt a system of 
HIV case reporting that encouraged (though did not require) the use of names. The shift towards 
name-reporting reflects many Americans’ beliefs that previous AIDS responses had been 
inadequate and unaggressive.19 Most AIDS-service organizations continued to support UI and 
oppose name reporting, though the CDC found that “such an approach would simply impede the 
adoption of an effective system of surveillance.” 20 The divergence of opinions on UI by AIDS-
service organizations and the CDC highlights underlying biases that inform government policy. 
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Service organizations worked first-hand with infected individuals, and thus were more 
sympathetic towards the privacy concerns of persons living with HIV/AIDS.        
Internationally, a common method of global surveillance included the use of unlinked 
anonymous testing (UAT). UAT involves screening blood specimens that were taken for 
purposes besides HIV testing and stripping them of personal identifiers without informed consent 
of the patient. This was done in an attempt to gather data for public health officials to analyze 
that would not be tainted by selection or participation bias.21 This response policy faced backlash 
from ethicists, policymakers, and academics for a multitude of reasons; the failure to obtain 
consent from the patients raised ethical questions and also prevented medical practitioners from 
notifying those who had tested positive. The tides turned most dramatically against UAT when 
the United States developed guidance for AIDS surveillance as a part of the President's 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). This plan dictated that the default position was 
non-UAT-based surveillance and that “a waiver should be submitted to conduct UAT 
surveillance.”22 As a result of these shortcomings and public opposition, most countries have 
since abandoned this method. 
Privacy considerations are of particular import when it comes to examining HIV/AIDS 
response policies. In 1987 as many as 90% of AIDS cases in North America were in people who 
are homosexual, bisexual, hemophiliac, and/or those exposed through intravenous drug abuse or 
contaminated blood products.23 This is significant because a large proportion of infected 
individuals come from groups that are marginalized, and as a result stigma around HIV/AIDS 
itself has developed. The need for confidentiality in the handling of identifying and tracking 
those infected individuals is therefore of the utmost importance.  
Problematically, there are often breaches of confidentiality when it comes to handling 
sensitive health information. There have been many instances of disclosure of such information, 
leading to a sense of distrust and fear from those who are affected by HIV/AIDS.24 For example, 
in 1991 a doctor at Pacific Oaks Medical Group (a clinic specializing in AIDS treatment) 
disclosed the information of infected patients to a fellow doctor looking to solicit supporters for 
homosexual candidate who was running for office.25 This is merely one example of an 
unquantifiable number of unwarranted disclosures that led affected populations to believe 
disclosures were common.26 
 Disclosures are damaging to HIV/AIDS public health responses because “in the context 
of the intense concerns of gay men about government intentions and the severe consequences of 
disclosure of HIV status, the guarantee of confidentiality was a prerequisite to encouraging 
affected populations to access the health care system.”27 Inadequate privacy protections can deter 
high-risk populations from seeking essential care and can hinder effective tracking that can 
mitigate the spread of HIV/AIDS. As a result, confidentiality should be prioritized when 
designing and implementing any public health strategies. 
If the difficult experience responding to SARS and HIV/AIDS has taught us anything, it 
is that there is a delicate balance between designing effective (and often intrusive) public health 
strategies and preserving the rights of those who are affected by pandemics. These issues existed 
before and throughout the development of the technology that exists today; as a result the 
effectiveness and intrusiveness of health surveillance has exponentially increased. Although 
nations such as Cuba have claimed great success in preventing the spread of a disease such as 
AIDS, they have not done so without threatening the ability to maintain necessary 
confidentiality. On the other hand, states such as Maryland and Texas learned the hard way that 
protecting the privacy of infected individuals can impede the effectiveness of a public health 
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strategy. Strategies developed in response to COVID-19 should keep in mind the lessons of past 
pandemics and work to find a balance between privacy and efficacy.   
 
Section III: Background on COVID-19 and its Privacy Implications 
 COVID-19, commonly referred to as coronavirus, originated in Wuhan, China in 2019. 
Though the origins of the disease are disputed, it is thought that it likely emerged in the Hunan 
seafood market in Wuhan and quickly spread to more than 50 individuals.28 The disease is spread 
from human to the human and is highly transmissible and deadly. As a result, it has spread to 
nearly every country and has claimed millions of lives. Nations across the globe have rushed to 
find different solutions to combat this growing crisis. Yet in their haste to develop effective 
public health strategies, concerns about rights and privacy have been oft left unconsidered.  
 Rights protection plays an important role in determining the efficacy of any response. In 
order for any contact tracing to be effective, public trust and enthusiasm is a must.29 This is 
especially important for any voluntary solutions; if concerns over privacy exist, there is little to 
no chance of adoption being widespread. A study conducted in April 2020 by the University of 
Washington surveyed the opinions and preferences of 100 individuals.30 The study found that 
while 72% of those surveyed were open to downloading a contact tracing app that “protected 
their data perfectly,” that number decreased as they were asked about an app with less 
protections. For example, when respondents were asked about an app that knew their location but 
claimed not to share it, only 19% of respondents said they would be extremely likely to 
download it. In addition, only 49% of respondents felt that it was somewhat likely that they 
would download an app that shared their location with their government. Public trust and privacy 
protections are important to consider in designing any public health measure. If public trust is 
undermined, people will be less likely to follow other public health advice (such as wearing 
masks or social distancing) that could help prevent the spread of the virus.31 
 Concerns about the diminution of privacy rights are not limited to the short-term 
implications of COVID-19 public health strategies. In fact, there are many long-term concerns 
about the permanence of emergency measures. If countries spend lots of money and effort 
developing strong surveillance measures, they may be unwilling to dismantle them after the 
crisis has passed. This was seen in the United States after the terror attacks on 9/11. In response 
to these attacks, the United States government developed the Patriot Act and other anti-terror 
measures that continued to be used for purposes outside of their initial design.32 In the 
aforementioned survey conducted by researchers at the University of Washington, respondents 
were unsupportive of governments collecting and utilizing location data.33 Specifically, 
respondents felt that they did not trust their governments to use collected data solely for COVID-
19 mitigation efforts and 72% of respondents reported that they felt it was “extremely unlikely” 
that collected data would be deleted after the threat of COVID-19 subsided. In addition, more 
than half of respondents were concerned that sharing their data would “bring harm to themselves 
or their community.”34 When designing measures to combat the spread of COVID-19, caution 
surrounding their permanence and scope must be employed. 
 Another emerging issue involves the growing power and influence of the tech industry 
during the pandemic. As these companies work to promote a better public image during the 
crisis, they also hope to increase their influence on politics. During COVID-19, tech companies 
have increased their lobbying efforts in order to precipitate favorable policies and weak 
regulation of their behavior. This has led to concerns that privacy protections will be dismantled 
to support the interests of technology companies as a result of their ‘good behavior’ during the 
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pandemic.35 As nations turn to technology to enable and promote societal recovery from 
COVID-19, resources and power will be handed over to a limited number of private players in 
the technology sector.36 These companies face countless accusations of privacy infringement as 
they amass large amounts of personal data from their consumers. As a result, their empowerment 
during the COVID-19 crisis raises concerns about their ability to dismantle privacy protections 
in the future.  
 The global privacy issues that have arisen during COVID-19 will not fade even if a cure 
or vaccine is produced. As experts predict increasing incidents of serious pandemics, the rights 
issues that they pose become greater threats.37 The increase in pandemic frequency, coupled with 
rapid technological advancements, makes it imperative to consider and design adequate policy 
measures that balance public safety and individual privacy.  
 
Section V:  A Review of International COVID Policies, Their Effectiveness, And Their 
Privacy Implications  
 This section explores the diverse COVID-19 response policies implemented in China, 
South Korea, Singapore, Israel, the United States, and the European Union. For each country, the 
policies are identified, and their efficacy and privacy implications are explored. These countries 
were selected because they each utilized unique approaches that provide insight into the diverse 
array of possible public health measures.   
China: 
 Following the devastating 2003 SARS outbreak in China, the government drafted the 
“Regulations on Preparedness for the Response to Emergent Public Health Hazards” in order to 
create an emergency response plan for future epidemics.38 As a result, at the outset of the 
outbreak, China enacted measures such as closing transportation in Wuhan, canceling New Year 
celebrations and other large gatherings, enacting self-quarantine orders, and closing public 
spaces like schools and restaurants.39  
Additionally, the implementation of contact tracing apps has become widespread, often in 
the form of digital applications such as software on smartphones.40 China integrated one such 
software, dubbed “Health Code,” into the popular wallet app Alipay that has over 900 million 
users.41 Reports indicate that usage of the app is, in essence, mandatory for all kinds of 
movement within China; to use services such as public transportation or to enter a supermarket, 
one must display their status on the app.42 Those who use the app are given color-coded QR 
codes depending on their COVID-19 risk. Those who have not been exposed to an infected 
individual should display a green QR code, while those who may have come in contact with the 
virus or a carrier display yellow or red codes. China has also developed Artificial Intelligence 
applications such as chatbots or automated callers that review individuals’ travel histories in an 
attempt to identify and combat disease hotspots.43 Many companies require employees to submit 
a “travel verification report” upon return to work. Telecom providers formulate these reports 
which contain all the locations that an individual has traveled to for the past 14 days, as well as 
provide a recommended quarantine period based on the travel history. 
Although skepticism surrounds the COVID-19 infection and death statistics that China 
has reported, independent reports suggest that many of their measures are effective. An 
investigation published in Science explores China’s transmission control measures during the 
early stages of the outbreak in China suggests that the nation’s policies at least somewhat 
delayed the growth of the epidemic and reduced the number of cases.44 The investigation 
quantifies that without the national response and Wuhan travel ban, there would have been 
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744,000 confirmed cases in China by the February 19th, 2020; in the presence of these measures, 
there were only 29,839 confirmed cases reported as of February 2020, which is 96% fewer than 
there would have been without interventions.45  
China’s technology-assisted system of contact tracing has also had success in limiting the 
spread. A retrospective cohort study conducted by Qifang Bi of John Hopkins University, 
Yongsheng Wu of the Shenzhen Department of Public Health Information, Shujiang Mei of the 
Shenzhen Department of Communicable Diseases Control and Prevention, and Chenfei Ye of 
Harbin Institute of Technology at Shenzhen sampled 391 Chinese COVID-19 patients and their 
1,286 close contacts to investigate the efficacy of contact tracing control measures.46 The study 
found that, of the 379 confirmed cases who had a known mode of detection, 77% were detected 
via “symptom-based surveillance.”47 The study also found that contact tracing enabled quicker 
detection of COVID-19 cases. While COVID-19 takes on average 4.9 days to detect with 
symptom-based surveillance, contact tracing reduced the time to 2.7 days.48 Overall, the authors 
of the study said that they believe their research provides evidence that contact tracing is an 
effective measure.  
Despite the claimed successes of China’s COVID-19 response, many concerns about the 
government’s policies have emerged. For example, Alipay’s Health Code does not have a 
transparent system for deciding who is allowed in public spaces and who is designated to 
quarantine.49 Individuals have expressed frustrations about the lack of provided rationale for 
their rating; the app, which updates your contagion risk status in real-time, can change your 
status from green to red and any point and stay that way for an unspecified amount of time.50 In 
addition, breaches of confidentiality have occurred in regard to the identity of infected persons. 
For example, a Chinese telecom company, Chinese Mobile, recently sent texts to media outlets 
with infected individuals’ detailed travel history.51 This is clearly a violation of the individuals’ 
privacy rights, and merits apprehension. 
Furthermore, the Alipay’s Health Code appears to share information with the police, 
which has raised concerns about it being a “new form of automated social control.”52 A New 
York Times analysis of the software code found that “as soon as a user grants the software access 
to personal data, a piece of the program labeled ‘reportInfoAndLocationToPolice’ sends the 
person’s location, city name and an identifying code number to a server.”53 Additionally the 
analysis discovered that every time a person scans their code (an occurrence that happens 
numerous times as one travels about their city), their location is uploaded to the system’s servers, 
enabling authorities to in essence track individuals locations. The analysis concludes that “The 
sharing of personal data with the authorities further erodes the thin line separating China’s tech 
titans from the Communist Party government.”54 An additional fear is that these measures are not 
temporary or limited to the time of COVID-19, but rather that they are a calculated and 
permanent addition to China’s already advanced state surveillance system. 
 
South Korea: 
 During the worst of the COVID-19 outbreak, South Korea relied heavily on a 
combination of high-tech solutions and widespread testing. Working in tandem with private 
sector partners, the South Korean government built numerous high-capacity screening clinics. At 
the height of the outbreak, there were around 600 testing sites that completed up to 20,000 tests 
per day.55 This non-technological aspect of their response has garnered praise from the 
international community for its facilitation of timely testing. 
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South Korea also utilized GPS tracking and IT solutions to trace the spread of the disease. 
One GPS location-based tracking app, Corona 100m, is downloaded on a volunteer basis. The 
app has been reported to be wildly popular and was downloaded one million times within just 17 
days of its launch in February 2020.56 The app uses data provided by telecommunication 
companies and notifies users who are near (within 100 meters) to any location that an infected 
person has frequented.57 There are a variety of websites that are publicly available that track and 
show infection hotspots.58 One such website is Coronamap, which illustrates the travel histories 
of individuals who have been confirmed as COVID-19 carriers.59  
Additionally, South Korea has developed a mandatory app that uses GPS to track infected 
patients in quarantine and set off an alarm if they venture outside.60 Anyone who may have come 
into contact with these confirmed carriers is also put under mandatory quarantine; to enforce this 
the South Korean government has developed a “geo-fencing” system that relies on calls, home 
visits, and the voluntary use of a government quarantine app.61 Mobile testing teams from 
agencies such as the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) and Korea Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (KCDC) use location data, immigration records, CCTV footage, credit 
and debit card transactions, transit pass records, personal identification information, and 
prescription/medical records to track infected and potentially infected individuals.62 This 
collection is extensive, and has the potential to deeply infringe upon citizens’ privacy rights. 
South Korea promptly mitigated the spread of COVID-19 without taking severe measures 
such as closing many businesses or issuing widespread stay-at-home orders.63 In April, mere 
months after original concerns about the epidemic in South Korea emerged, there had only been 
10,708 cases with 240 deaths.64 Since mid-March, there have only been “a handful of new cases 
per day.”65 An article written by Sangchul Park of the University of Chicago, Gina Jeehyun Choi 
of the Korea Law Center, and Haksoo Ko of Seoul National University claims that South 
Koreans’ use of advanced information technology systems deserves credit for flattening the 
curve of new COVID-19 cases and deaths.66 
Nevertheless, South Korea’s use of technology has major privacy implications for its 
citizens. Though the availability of data may be useful for tracing efforts, it also enables 
problematic trends such as identifying COVID-19 carriers publicly.67 The collected and shared 
data includes information such as infection paths, hospitals of infected persons, the health of 
individuals who have had contact with infected persons, sex, nationality, and age (though names 
are not revealed).68 This level of detailed data makes it easy to identify and publicize the identity 
of infected individuals. This identification has led to profiling, unveiling of embarrassing 
personal details, public disdain, and loss of business for infected owners of restaurants, shops, 
and other businesses.69 Despite these negative impacts, the South Korean citizens do not 
necessarily disapprove of their government’s actions. In an unpublished survey of South Koreans 
conducted by Youngkee Ju of Hollym University and Myoungsoon You of Seoul National 
University between the months of February and April 2020,  the majority of respondents (68.2% 
) said that they would be willing to sacrifice their individual privacy rights in order to continue 
information-sharing practices with their government.70 This willingness likely stems from 
cultural factors; South Koreans are accustomed to sharing personal data with their government 
because it was a common practice in their nation even before the spread of COVID-19.71 
Importantly, in the aforementioned article written by Park, Choi, and Ko, the authors 
claim that the level of public data sharing in South Korea is unnecessary for effective COVID-19 
tracking and containment efforts.72 While acknowledging the importance of tracing the location 
and movement of infected individuals for epidemiologic purposes, these authors contend that 
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rather than revealing personal information to the public, it could be used to inform officials 
where to focus public health measures. The authors also suggest that the sharing of less precise 
location data could help to preserve the privacy of infected individuals. 
 
Singapore: 
 Singapore has also relied heavily on technology during the spread of COVID-19, and has 
found moderate success. One critical aspect of their approach is the government-developed 
TraceTogether app. This app utilizes Bluetooth technology in order to track the proximity of 
users’ phones to each other. If any individual is later diagnosed with COVID-19, the owners of 
phones that have been in proximity to the infected user’s phone can be notified to quarantine. 
While the Singaporean government claims that health officials “ask” to view and release the data 
from their phones, failing to assist the Ministry of Health to track movement is actually a crime 
in Singapore. The data taken from the phones are only stored for 21 days. Singapore has also 
enacted surveillance measures for infected patients. These measures consist of daily phone 
check-ins, randomized SMS messages including links to check location, and the requirement that 
infected patients send images of their surroundings to verify that they are in quarantine.73 Those 
who do not comply can face detainment, isolation, and be forced to be tracked with RFID 
technology.74 
 The TraceTogether app is unique in that it is voluntarily downloaded by users. This 
aspect of the app originally hindered its efficacy; as of April, only 16% of the population 
downloaded TraceTogether.75 Nevertheless, as the severity of the virus and knowledge of its 
spread increases, so did citizens’ willingness to utilize the app. Currently, the app has 2.3 million 
users76; for context, the country had a population of 5.7 million as of June 2019.77 The app’s 
efficacy aside, Singapore has generally done well during COVID-19 despite its close proximity 
to and involvement with China. The COVID-19 infection spread in Singapore is one of the 
slowest in the world, and the COVID-19 death rate is also very low.78 Overall, Singapore has 
successfully managed the virus. 
Many privacy concerns have emerged regarding the TraceTogether app. While it 
succeeds in protecting the identity of users from each other, it does not afford the same 
protections from the government. Any diagnosed individual must give the list of locations they 
have visited (compiled in the TraceTogether app) to the Ministry of Health. The Ministry in turn 
collects the cell phone numbers that the infected individuals’ phone has come into contact with.79 
While there is no indication that this information is being abused, its collection is nonetheless 
concerning because the identity of infected individuals and those they have physically come into 
contact with is not protected from the government in any way. Furthermore, the government’s 
creation of a database that contains location information connected to individuals numbers 
presents the possibility of the government tracking the locations of its individuals.80 Though 




 Although countries in the EU by no means acted uniformly in their responses to COVID-
19, there are certainly observable trends. For example, a report published by the Hague Center 
for Strategic Studies identifies two prominent trends of technologically-assisted responses that 
were implemented throughout the European Union.81 The first trend consisted of enacting 
anonymized phone location tracking. Utilizing connections to cellular businesses, the 
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governments of Belgium, Austria, Estonia, France, Germany, Latvia, Greece, Portugal, Italy, and 
Spain utilized data provided from companies such as Orange S.A., Tele2, A1, Deutsche 
Telekom, Vodafone, and LMT to track individuals’ movements and the spread of the virus.82 In 
total, at least 13 countries in the EU have confirmed access to their citizens’ anonymized location 
data.83 The uses of this data varies, and includes aiding with insight on movement trends and 
checking compliance with lockdown orders. The second observed trend was the widespread 
government implementation of contact tracing apps. Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain, 
Ireland, and Croatia all have contact tracing apps and projects in use or development.84  
 Notably, countries within the European Union are cooperating to find solutions. For 
example, Germany is spearheading collaborations with the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving 
Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) project.85 A concerned group of scientists and technologists from 
more than eight European nations have taken on this project in the hopes of proposing solutions 
that are both effective and conscious of privacy issues. The EU has supported such efforts and 
recommends the implementation of a coordinated approach towards mobile tracing 
applications.86 This aligns with the EU’s stance that requires member states to share the 
information that they collect regarding contact-tracing with other nations in the EU via the 
electronic Early Warning and Response System.87 This information includes personal and health 
data such as health status and travel history of infected individuals.88 
Countries utilizing anonymized phone location data have seen moderate successes. These 
successes include insight into population movement and trends during the pandemic. For 
example, the telecom company Orange (in partnership with the French Government), had 
sufficient information to find that 17% of Parisians moved away from the French capital.89 
Additionally, countries have used collected information to shape their policy decisions. In Italy, 
the government used telecom reports to inform their decision to bolster lockdown measures after 
finding that their citizens were still moving about.90 Furthermore in Latvia, the telecom company 
LMT has asserted that the data they share could be used to inform law enforcement of large, 
illegal gatherings.91 It is clear that countries in the EU are not merely collecting anonymized 
phone location data, but instead analyzing it to make informed decisions for effective public 
health measures. 
Contract tracing in the EU has faced some setbacks that limit efficacy. First, there is the 
universal problem with the contact tracing: it relies on high-risk groups such as children and 
senior citizens to have sufficient technology and knowledge of its use.92 In addition, academics 
have warned that apps can lead to a false sense of security which can cause individuals to forgo 
compliance with other measures.93 This problem is compounded by issues with the actual 
reliability and accuracy of contact tracing apps. While widespread contact tracing certainly has 
its merits, it seems unwise to solely rely on it to curb the spread of the virus. 
Concern for privacy rights in the EU is certainly present in the time of COVID-19. While 
a survey of individuals in the EU residents found that 83% of respondents approved of fining 
those who violate quarantine, banning of public gatherings, and closing borders, 23% of 
respondents disapproved of using mobile phone data for tracking purposes.94 In fact, the survey 
found that the issue that was most polarizing among respondents was governments’ use of 
cellphone data for COVID-19 tracking.95 The EU has some of the world’s strongest digital 
privacy protections, which were bolstered in 2018 by the implementation of the General Data 
Protection Regulation. As a result, governments and telecom companies have taken steps to put 
privacy-related fears to rest. For example, telecom providers work to anonymize and aggregate 
data before it is shared. Specifically, when aggregating data the companies use groups of at least 
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30 users to prevent identification of individuals from their data.96 This anonymization is legally 
necessary for countries hoping to share their data with other nations in the EU without the 
consent of users.97 Sharing data across the EU has faced vocal criticism; Hannah van 
Kolfschooten and Anniek de Ruijter of Amsterdam Law School argue that in mandating data 
sharing, the “European Commission has implicitly decided that the protection of public health 
outweighs the importance of the right to privacy in case of serious cross border threats to 
health.”98 The plethora of concerns and criticisms by citizens and academics in the EU give 
evidence that further privacy considerations for COVID-19 measures are necessary. 
 
United States: 
 The United States’ approach to combating COVID-19 consists of a very decentralized 
system of response. The federal government took actions such as suspending travel from China 
in February and from 26 European countries in March. Furthermore, institutions such as the 
CDC and many US embassies made statements discouraging non-essential travel. While travel 
certainly decreased within the United States, it remains unclear whether this was a result of these 
warnings or other factors. The individual states within the nation largely made their own unique 
policies and responses during the pandemic. As of August 2020, there is no centralized or 
widespread method of contact tracing in the United States. The development of contact tracing 
measures has largely been left up to states rather than the federal government. This has led to a 
lag in tracing, leaving the US far behind its international peers. While states such as California, 
Washington, and Massachusetts have invested significant resources in hopes of developing large-
scale contact tracing measures, many other states have implemented little in the way of contact 
tracing.99  
The United States’ infection and mortality rates reflect the efficacy of the nations’ 
response to COVID-19. In August 2020, at least 5,140,300 Americans were infected and at least 
164,000 had died.100 In addition, the United States leads the world in both cases and deaths. 
Some experts, such as Adriane Casalotti, chief of government and public affairs at the National 
Association of County and City Health, blame the concerning rates of infection and spread on 
insufficient contact tracing measures.101 It is clear that the United States’ public health measures 
during COVID-19 are largely insufficient and ineffective. 
The failure to enact comprehensive public health measures coincides with the 
prioritization and protection of privacy in the United States. Culturally, this can be 
contextualized with the general emphasis on individual freedoms and rights within the nation. 
Victor Cha of the Center for Strategic and International Studies explains that, “For countries in 
the West still suffering from the virus, political leaders struggle over the tradeoff between 
privacy rights and the use of smartphone app-tracking technology for contact tracing.”102 
Interestingly, while the American people tend to be adamantly opposed to government 
infringement upon their privacy, they allow big tech to access and collect enormous amounts of 
their data. This raises fundamental questions about how privacy is conceptualized by the 
American people.  
Furthermore, recent issues with data privacy in America have led policymakers to be 
cautious about technological strategies. Although the White House did meet with the leaders of 
big tech during COVID-19, conversations surrounding mobile tracing and location technologies 
were reportedly avoided.103 Another factor that may influence American’s aversion to more 
intrusive public health measures is the nation's experience (or lack thereof) with SARS, MERS, 
and Ebola. The United States faces a mere 27 cases of SARS, 2 cases of MERS, and 11 cases of 
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Ebola. While nations that were more affected by these diseases put in place precautionary public 
health measures, the United States remained unprepared for a pandemic such as COVID-19.104  
 
Israel: 
The Israeli government has taken one of the most extreme approaches to curtailing the 
spread of COVID-19. At first, the government worked to stop flights into the country, create 
social distancing guidelines, close schools, and impose curfews.105 To add to these measures, the 
Israeli Health Ministry has created a voluntary app, entitled “HaMagen,” which uses cellular 
location data over 14 days to check for contact with infected individuals.106 Additionally, the 
Israeli government has relied on Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service, to help with tracing 
and identifying COVID-19 carriers using cell phone location data.107 In order to do this, the 
Health Ministry is required to share the names, ID numbers, and cell phone numbers of infected 
individuals. Shin Bet then uses a classified database dubbed “the Tool” to retrieve cell phone 
data from cellular providers which enables them to identify anyone who has been within two feet 
of an infected individual for more than 15 minutes.108 Once the information is collected, Shin Bet 
notifies the Health Ministry, which in turn attempts to reach potentially infected contacts and 
instruct them to quarantine. There have also been reports that Shin Bet has used the collected 
information to inform police on defiance of quarantine orders.109  
The data collected by Shin Bet is incredibly detailed, and includes information on 
location, voice calls and text messages (their occurrence but not their content), and website 
visitation.110 The intrusive nature of these measures has caused concern about the privacy and 
rights of Israeli citizens. As a result, the measures have faced challenges in the courts. In late 
April, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that “explicit statutory authority” rather than executive 
authorization was necessary to continue the program in the case Ben Meir v. Prime Minister.111 
Despite this challenge, the program will seemingly prevail as recent legislation has passed that 
authorizes Shin Bet to extend the practice of its measures for at least another six months.112 
Although Israel initially had success in preventing the spread of COVID-19, rising 
infection and mortality rates in July and August have set back the nations’ progress. In the early 
days of the pandemic, Israel’s public health measures caused the rates of infection to plummet to 
10-20 new cases per day.113 To the world, it appeared that Israel was making all the right 
moves.114 Unfortunately, in late June and early July, the number of cases began to rise again. 
Citizens are blaming the increase in infections on the government’s reopening of schools and 
permitting large gatherings such as weddings.115 On July 15th, Israel reported 42,813 cases and 
375 deaths.116 Furthermore, on July 21st, Israel faced over 1,500 new coronavirus cases daily.117 
This infection rate is more than twice as high as it was during March and April.118 The initial 
successes of Israel have given way to a concerning second wave as restrictions were hastily and 
prematurely loosened. 
Taking one of the most intrusive approaches to disease control, Israel has significantly 
infringed on its citizens’ privacy rights. In utilizing its domestic security service for 
implementation of COVID-19 measures, Israel has made clear that this problem, as well as most 
others the nation faces, is one of national security.119 As such, Israel has created an opportunity 
for its national surveillance to extend to areas besides public health.120 The Israeli government 
justifies these measures with a host of explanations: contact-tracing is ineffective as individuals’ 
memories are fallible, the large Orthodox community does not own cell phones, and the 
impossibility of otherwise tracing the contact of individuals in crowded places.121 Despite these 
rationales, it still appears that unnecessarily invasive and stringent measures are being put into 
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place. For example, there is no form of appeal for those who may be incorrectly classified as a 
potential contact.122 Furthermore, Israel’s aforementioned use of “the Tool” operates with no 
judicial oversight. Its use is generally classified and the contents, storage length, and protection 
of collected data are largely unknown.123 Israel’s approach to COVID-19 - shrouded in secrecy 
and heavily reliant on intrusive surveillance - certainly poses threats to the long-term privacy 
rights of its citizens. 
 
Taiwan: 
 Taiwan, known for its technological prowess, has predictably relied heavily on data 
collection and technology for its COVID-19 mitigations efforts. One of the main control 
measures being employed is the border quarantine: those who return to Taiwan must either 
quarantine in a hotel or return to their own residences and undergo intense digital surveillance 
for a 14-day period.124 The surveillance measures include digital fencing, which consists of using 
an electronic fence or perimeter, enabled by cell tower triangulation from telecom providers, that 
sets a boundary that a quarantined individual must stay within.125 In order to ensure that 
individuals do not simply leave their phones at home and travel as they wish, officials video call 
multiple times a day to check in and failure to answer one of these check ins results in heavy 
fines. Furthermore if a quarantined individual’s cellular device runs out of battery or is turned 
off, the police will report to their house.126 During the 14-day mandatory quarantine, each 
individual received a $33 per day stipend. If at any time an individual breaks the quarantine, they 
are forced to pay back one thousand times the stipend received.127  
Taiwan also employed a variety of datasets to supplement its surveillance efforts. For 
example, the National Health Insurance database has been merged with the immigrations and 
customs dataset in order to ensure individuals had undergone health screenings and disclosed 
their travel history.128 In addition, Taiwan has implemented forms of contact tracing. The first 
100 confirmed COVID-19 cases were all extensively tracked.129 An outbreak investigation team, 
led by the Taiwan CDC, thoroughly investigates cases and possible contacts.130 It is important to 
note that since Taiwan has seen relatively few cases (numbering less than 1,000), contact tracing 
may be a less important measure than in other nations where the spread is far more prevalent. 
Taiwan’s response has generally been very effective and has helped curtail both the 
spread of COVID-19 and the resulting deaths in the nation. As of August 17, 2020, the nation 
had only 500 cases and a mere seven deaths.131 Taiwan’s successes come even in the face of 
significant challenges such as proximity to mainland China and frequent travel between the two 
neighbors.132 The technological aspects of Taiwan’s response have been credited for these 
strikingly low statistics.133 Technology plays an important role in shaping Taiwan’s culture and 
identity. As a result, citizens have enthusiastically engaged in both the use and production of 
virus-mitigation technologies. Jaron Lanier and E. Glen Weyl of Microsoft explain that “bottom-
up information sharing, public-private partnerships, ‘hacktivism’ (activism through the building 
of quick-and-dirty but effective proofs of concept for online public services), and participatory 
collective action have been central to the country’s success in coordinating a consensual and 
transparent set of responses to the coronavirus.”134  
Though some of Taiwan’s measures such as digital fencing may seem invasive, the 
general widespread trust in the government and transparency of officials’ actions have helped to 
ease fears of privacy intrusion. Examples of government officials’ transparency include daily 
briefings from political leaders and scientific experts as well as the broadcasting of all of Digital 
Minister Tang’s meetings.135 This communication has helped maintain citizens’ confidence 
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despite the curtailment of privacy rights.136 The Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation conducted a 
survey of 1079 Taiwanese citizens in order to assess their opinions of their government’s actions. 
80% of those surveyed approved of the Minister of Health and Welfare’s handling of COVID-19 
and 70% approved of the president and the premier’s work.137 The government's empowerment 
of previously mentioned “hacktivists” likely has to do with these high approval ratings. By 
allowing citizens to shape and produce the very measures they are subject to, the Taiwanese 
government has created a form of ‘“participatory self-surveillance.”138 One example of this is 
Taiwanese citizens who, in collaboration with their government, created an online tool that 
aggregated data on the availability and location of face masks. As Andreas Kluth of Bloomberg 
explains, “by involving people in the solutions, rather than just dictating policies to them, the 
process is transparent and inspires trust, even civic pride.”139 It seems as though Taiwan has 




The diverse array of public health measures implemented by different nations enable 
meaningful and informative comparisons. The failures of both the intensely invasive approaches 
of countries like Israel and China, and the astonishingly weak effort by the U.S. reveal the 
dangers of living on either extreme of the privacy spectrum. The experiences of the countries in 
between these extremes provide guidance for future policymakers.   
China’s extreme secrecy enabled the virus to spread far beyond its borders; although this 
failure may not have had domestic health implications, it should certainly be considered when 
measuring the success of the nations’ measures. Israel’s measures have also proven to be 
somewhat unsuccessful; the nation’s burgeoning second wave undermines the government’s 
claims that stringent surveillance is the best response to COVID-19.  
On the other side of the spectrum, the United States’ approach has been an arguably 
worse catastrophe. The United States, ever concerned with the protection of individual liberties, 
has struggled to create effective measures that can coexist with the utmost protection of rights. 
The unwillingness of Americans to sacrifice even limited rights for the larger societal good has 
led to unthinkable rates of infection and mortality. In addition, the Trump administration’s 
sluggish and insufficient attempts to address the disease played a large role in the nation’s 
ultimate failure. Lacking an efficient federal strategy, the United States has failed to use any 
widespread data collection or contact tracing measures to curtail the spread. Though Americans 
are averse to rights infringements, the absence of any meaningful attempts to track the spread 
with contact tracing measures makes it hard to discern whether the problem lies with American 
cultural norms or with the Trump administration itself. What is clear, however, is that both 
overreaction and inaction are problematic as governments grapple with COVID-19. 
Although South Korea has low infection and mortality rates, the nation has by no means 
found a tenable balance between privacy and public health. Its health successes are tainted by the 
unnecessary disclosure of personal information that has enabled reidentification and 
ostracization. While South Korea has developed solid tracing and prevention infrastructure, it 
needs to do far better in the protection of privacy to be considered a true success story.  
Nations in the EU are struggling to find a unified approach, which is reflected in the 
infection and mortality rates. As of August, a second wave of COVID-19 threatens most of 
Europe.140 This has led to the shuttering of borders and increase in testing throughout the EU. 
Still, the EU deserves recognition for mitigating the first wave after a devastating March and 
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April in Italy. Furthermore, there are valiant attempts at considering privacy throughout the EU. 
The coalition entitled Pan-European Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing has worked to 
provide suggestions for “privacy-friendly contact tracing apps.”141 While the EU has not been 
ultimately successful in battling COVID-19, it is at least attempting a balance between privacy 
and public health.  
Singapore and Taiwan have found the most success in the balancing of priorities. 
Singapore’s TraceTogether app, while initially facing challenges with voluntary adoption, has 
now grown into a global success story. TraceTogether is effective in tracking the movement of 
the virus while also protecting privacy with limited 21-day data storage and protection of users' 
identities from fellow users. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies labeled TraceTogether’s use 
of Bluetooth technology as the “least intrusive” option among mobile tracing applications.142 
Singapore’s approach appears to be moderately effective as well, with the country boasting very 
low mortality rates. In addition, Taiwan’s measures have had wild success rates. With only 7 
reported deaths in a population of nearly 24 million citizens, it is clear that the Taiwanese 
government is utilizing the country’s technology savvy to its benefit. Furthermore, Taiwan’s 
transparency and inclusion of its citizens in developing public health measures has helped 
mitigate fears of privacy infringement. Taiwan’s triumph proves that governments can indeed 
use technology to fight COVID-19 without foregoing the protection of privacy rights.  
 
Section V: Factors that Influence Response Type - A Case Study of China and the United 
Kingdom  
While it is important to consider how nations differ in their responses, it is also vital to 
consider why they have chosen distinct approaches. Factors such as regime type, leadership, 
national pandemic history, and privacy norms play an important role in shaping a nation’s 
response. The importance of these factors emerges clearly when comparing the starkly divergent 
responses of two very different countries: China and the United Kingdom. China’s regime type, 
which has become increasingly totalitarian, empowers it to forcefully enact strict shutdowns and 
contact tracing measures while simultaneously stymying the necessary flow of information via 
state censorship. China’s leader, Xi Jinping has played an important role in charting China’s 
response, as he has utilized his strongman rule to create and enforce effective public health 
measures. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has struggled to control the virus for almost 
its entire duration, and is currently in the midst of a devastating second wave. This can partly be 
attributed to the United Kingdom’s regime type, parliamentary democracy, which constrains the 
country from enacting intense surveillance methods as in China, and requires the government to 
respond to the demands of the general population. Furthermore, Boris Johnson’s populist 
leadership and disconnect with science has led the nation to greatly suffer. 
 China’s powerful centralized government allows it to implement highly invasive policies 
that would not be permitted in democracies because of their intrusiveness. For example, the 
aforementioned Chinese app “Health Code” tracks the movements of users and controls their 
quarantine status to an extreme degree by dictating if a person can access public spaces. While 
Democratic countries such as Taiwan and South Korea have also implemented COVID-19 
tracing efforts, those governments' responses have been far more transparent and much less 
intrusive than China’s efforts.143 As discussed in the previous section, in Taiwan location-based 
tracking is generally confined to those who have recently entered the country. In South Korea, 
the download of the most popular contact tracing app, Corona 100m, is done on an entirely 
volunteer basis.144 In contrast to these responses, China’s app is, in essence, mandatory for all 
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individuals wishing to function in society, and its implementation has been overwhelmingly non-
transparent. The government’s opacity is evident in its decision to secretly embed the Health 
Code application feature that sends the collected location information directly to the police.145 
While democratic countries can certainly implement tracing efforts, the scope of their 
invasiveness is generally limited by citizen pushback and partisan politicking. Totalitarian 
regimes, on the other hand, may infringe upon citizens’ privacy with greater ease as they blur the 
line between state and society.   
Although the increasingly totalitarian regime in China allows for invasive but effective 
public health measures to be implemented, their style of centralized government has also faced 
difficulties in mitigating the harms of the pandemic. The government aims to have a high degree 
of control over the flow of information, frequently engaging in state censorship. This can 
backfire, however, as critical intelligence can be muffled in the effort to constrain 
communications. The failure of information to flow both up to policymakers in the Politburo and 
down to citizens on the street could be a possible explanation for China's delayed response. If the 
Chinese government was unaware of the extent of the virus due to censorship, it may have been 
unable to adequately and promptly address the situation and quickly develop public health 
measures. While one cannot know for certain the extent and timeline of the government’s 
knowledge of COVID-19, another issue that almost certainly impacted the Chinese response was 
the population’s lack of information about the virus early on. When doctor Li Wenliang spoke 
out about the virus, he was interrogated and silenced by the government, and eventually perished 
from COVID-19.146 Because the government attempted to control COVID-19 information during 
the early days of the pandemic, citizens were unable to take necessary precautionary measures or 
adequately protect themselves from the disease. China’s inability to quickly address the 
pandemic due to issues with information flow had serious implications; A simulation done by 
researchers at the University of Southampton concluded that had China implemented its control 
measures a mere week earlier, it could have prevented 67% of its cases.147 
China’s leadership is another critical factor in the country’s response. President Xi 
Jinping has centralized power under himself and become a personalistic strongman. President 
Xi’s willingness to employ “draconian” and “repressive” means, such as swiftly quarantining the 
11 million people of Wuhan, are a result of his strongman rule.148 Insulated from particularist 
pressures and firmly in control of internal security, the military, the police, the National Security 
Commission, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), President Xi has been able to implement 
policies that a less secure political figure likely could not. President Xi has been active in 
purging political rivals and those who speak out against him.149 This massive consolidation of 
power allowed President Xi to not only have the capability to impose China’s extensive 
response, but also the political capital to do so. President Xi’s COVID-19 approach would be 
risky for a politician that is highly prone to the whims of the people or vulnerable to criticisms 
from rivals. The shutdowns so necessary for combating the spread of COVID-19 can certainly 
cause harm to the economy, which in the short term can be very unpopular with the masses. Yet 
President Xi was able to pursue such a policy without fear of immediate backlash. While 
President Xi’s strongman rule may not permanently overpower dissent, in the short term it has 
enabled him to enact necessary but potentially unpopular COVID-19 measures. The success of 
those measures has now bolstered the popularity of President Xi and further cemented his 
strongman rule. 
Another factor to consider when analyzing China’s response is the country’s history with 
confronting pandemics. The Chinese experience with SARS and the resulting “Regulations on 
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Preparedness for the Response to Emergent Public Health Hazards” afforded China some 
preparation for the pandemic. While other countries struggled to consult experts and rapidly 
develop a plan during the first wave of COVID-19, China was able to utilize its existing policy 
infrastructure to address the crisis. Furthermore, Chinese citizens, scarred by the toll of SARS, 
were willing to make sacrifices in the name of public health. Citizens in nations that were less 
affected by SARS, such as the United Kingdom, have demonstrated less willingness to make 
sacrifices such as quarantining and wearing masks for the broader good of public health. China’s 
SARS experience has thus worked to increase compliance of the citizenry with public health 
measures and overall improved COVID-19 outcomes in China.   
The United Kingdom has been far less successful in managing the spread of COVID-19, 
and has the second-highest coronavirus death toll of the world's wealthiest nations.150 The United 
Kingdom, like China, had a slow start to its pandemic response. Early on, Prime Minister Boris 
Johnson chose to promote the idea of “herd immunity,” which entailed letting the virus naturally 
spread so that a large portion of the population eventually becomes immune.151 However, in late 
March, the Prime Minister reversed course and implemented a three-month lockdown. Despite 
this lockdown effort in the Spring, the United Kingdom has suffered from a second spike. 
Although the United Kingdom has been credited with increasing the country’s testing capacity, 
the failure of the government to use the collected data or adequately implement robust contact 
tracing has limited the testing’s efficacy. Though the United Kingdom has made steps to combat 
the spread of the virus, they have thus far been much less effective than the Chinese measures. 
The parliamentary democracy within the United Kingdom certainly impacted how the 
government chose to respond. In a democracy where political officials are held accountable to 
the people, the government is inherently responsive to the demands of its citizens. As a result, 
citizens’ discontent about the prolonged lockdown and economic harms of COVID-19 public 
health measures may have stymied the government’s ability to create a more robust response that 
would require greater citizen sacrifice. The government in the United Kingdom faced severe 
political pressure to ease the COVID-19 restrictions because they were thought to suppress the 
economy and limit citizen’s freedoms.152 While politicians being held accountable to the 
citizenry is one of the marked strengths of democracy, in times of crisis where unpopular 
sacrifice is necessary, some democratic regimes may flounder. 
The leader of the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Boris Johnson, played a large role in 
shaping the country's COVID-19 response. The Prime Minister has faced great criticism for his 
promotion of “herd immunity,” and was mocked after he became infected with COVID-19 
himself. Many have blamed the Prime Minister’s failed response on his populist leadership style. 
Populist leaders across the globe, such as President Donald Trump in America and President Jair 
Bolsonaro in Brazil, preside over the countries that have been some of the worst affected by 
COVID-19.153 One reason that populist leaders may falter in the face of the pandemic is that 
populism, by nature, often leads to the disparagement of expert knowledge and the propagation 
of anti-elite and anti-scientific attitudes.154 The anti-establishment element of populism presents 
a threat during COVID-19, where reliance and collaboration with established health experts and 
organizations is imperative.  
In Britain, the disconnect between the scientific community and the populist Prime 
Minister has become painfully clear. Sir Patrick Vallance, chosen by Prime Minister Boris 
Johnson to be his chief scientific adviser, has rejected the scientific community's known aversion 
to “herd immunity” and chose to promote it. Sir Patrick Vallance publicly announced that “herd 
immunity” would require 40 million Britons to catch the disease, but failed to mention that an 
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estimated 250,000 would perish.155 Furthermore, a group of senior British scientific advisers, 
who are members of the Scientific Advisory Group on Emergencies (SAGE), have found their 
advice blatantly ignored by Prime Minister Boris Johnson. Although SAGE recommended that 
the Prime Minister impose a myriad of restrictions, including banning contact within the home 
and closing all bars, restaurants, and indoor gyms in early September, the Prime Minister opted 
only to advise individuals to work from home if possible.156 The divide between the scientific 
community and populist Prime Minister Johnson may account for the country’s dismal COVID-
19 response. 
In addition, norms surrounding the protection of an individual’s rights may have led to 
bureaucratic delays as a product of privacy concerns. One reason that England’s contact tracing 
program, Test and Trace, has had limited success is because it is highly bureaucratic in its efforts 
to protect patient confidentiality.157 For example, if a known contact resides in the same house as 
an infected individual, their personal information cannot be collected by contact tracers who 
conduct home visits. Instead, the contacts must wait days until the tracers reach out to them. This 
slows the process of contact tracing and hampers the government’s efforts to alert potentially 
infected individuals. A study conducted by Reuter’s found that in England, the Test and Trace 
program has only been able to trace one non-household contact for every two confirmed cases of 
COVID-19.158 To put that in perspective, the Singaporean government can trace, on average, 
twenty contacts for every confirmed case of COVID-19.  
In China, citizens have become accustomed to government surveillance and privacy 
intrusions. As a result, the government could successfully implement its Health Code tracing 
app, which instantly notifies an individual if one of their contacts has tested positive. Such an 
app would likely never be allowed in the United Kingdom, where the Information 
Commissioner's Office is tasked with protecting data privacy for all individuals.159 The stark 
difference in China’s successful Health Code and the United Kingdom’s lackluster Test and 
Trace can be largely attributed to the privacy norms. While the Chinese government has little 
transparency in how the Health Code application functions, what data is being collected by the 
app, and who has access to the data, the United Kingdom is forced to enact heavily bureaucratic 
and inefficient systems in order to ensure that the identity of persons infected with COVID-19 
are protected. The privacy norms that exist in different countries therefore greatly affect the 
nature and efficacy of response measures.  
China, currently boasting staggeringly low rates of daily cases, has emerged as a winner 
of the COVID-19 pandemic.160 It’s response has been lauded for its efficacy, even as the nation 
suffered setbacks at the beginning of the crisis. While the officially reported numbers may seem 
suspect to some, as the Chinese government is known for its use of propaganda and information 
manipulation, China’s response has been generally thought of as a success.161 The United 
Kingdom, on the other hand, has struggled for almost the entire duration of the pandemic. The 
country has failed to get a strong grasp on the spread of the virus, despite the delayed yet lengthy 
shutdowns in the spring. The disparities in the countries’ responses can be attributed to 
innumerable factors, yet some emerge more clearly than others. First, regime type is of the 
utmost importance; while in China, the increasingly totalitarian regime has been able implement 
necessarily stringent public health measures, the democratic British government has struggled to 
enact efficacious but unpopular policies. Individual leaders have also influenced the path of the 
pandemic. President Xi has used his strongman rule to implement drastic yet effective measures, 
while populist Prime Minister Boris Johnson has distanced himself from science with devastating 
consequences. Other factors such as national pandemic history and privacy norms have impacted 
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countries’ response efforts as well. Juxtaposing the vastly different responses of China and the 
United Kingdom may allow other countries and leaders to see where their peers have succeeded 
and failed, and to shape their own responses accordingly. 
 
 
Section VI: Policy Suggestions 
 The use of technology is unavoidable when devising the most effective approach to 
COVID-19. As a result, privacy rights will inevitably be affected by the new and extensive 
public health measures. In order to minimize the privacy implications of responses while also 
maintaining their efficacy, a Bluetooth-based contact tracing app is advisable. Such an app 
would function similarly to Singapore’s TraceTogether; individual’s cellular devices can emit 
signals or “tokens” which are then used to record proximity to other nearby devices and 
individuals. If any individual is later diagnosed as a confirmed COVID-19 case, their contacts 
can be traced and notified. This approach protects the privacy of individuals’ movements since it 
uses data on a person's proximity to other users rather than the location of the user themselves. 
Put simply, such an app could detect the who but not the where of an individual’s contacts. This 
kind of tracking is actually preferable to GPS/location tracking in terms of its efficacy because it 
is generally more accurate and works in a multitude of otherwise difficult situations such as in 
indoor and underground settings or in crowded areas.162 It is also more effective than contact 
tracing that relies solely on the memory that users have of their locations and contacts. 
Another necessary aspect of such an app would be the veiling of individuals’ identities. 
When users’ devices come into contact and exchange “tokens”, they should be immediately 
anonymized to protect all individual’s identities from each other. Later, if a user is a confirmed 
carrier of COVID-19, anyone who received one of their “tokens” can be notified to quarantine. 
They will not, however, be notified of the identity of the individual that is the confirmed case. 
An app that utilizes Bluetooth is well-equipped to anonymize identities and protect the privacy of 
users because “the only information involved is contact tokens, which can be cryptographically 
secured in a way that is less vulnerable to de-anonymization than location histories.”163 
Beyond the design of a contact tracing app, more general guidelines can help shape 
privacy preserving practices. Marcello Ienca and Effy Vayena of the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology recommend three insightful data-management practices that help guide an interest-
balancing approach.164 First, the authors explain that the response should be proportional to the 
threat; a common cold would not merit the same data-collection efforts as COVID-19. Their 
second guideline relates to necessity. The least possible amount of data-collection should be 
utilized to achieve necessary efficacy. This guideline would likely address the approaches of 
both Israel and China, whose data collection has been far more extensive than what is likely 
absolutely necessary. The final guideline proposed by the authors addresses the need for 
scientific justification of proposed measures. This guideline could relate to South Korea’s public 
disclosure of the identities of infected individuals in South Korea. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has also provided valuable suggestions.165 
The OECD advises that the public remains knowledgeable of their government’s COVID-19 
policies and that the utmost transparency is employed when implementing new approaches. In 
addition, the OECD suggests that the duration of invasive COVID-19 technology use and data 
gathering be limited to what is absolutely necessary to avoid any measures becoming 
unnecessarily permanent. These guidelines can and should extend far beyond the development of 
tracing apps to all public health measures developed during COVID-19. 
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Section VII: Conclusion 
Past pandemics and the recent experience with COVID-19 have revealed the importance 
of rapid and effective responses in order to mitigate the spread of dangerous illnesses. As seen in 
the case of China, a speedy response can spare tens of thousands of lives. One needs only to look 
at America’s experience to see the unthinkable danger of a slow and ineffective approach to 
COVID-19. The virus is a stark reminder of the need to develop detailed, researched, and robust 
response plans in advance of, rather than in response to, future pandemics. 
Nonetheless serious privacy implications can arise that can have pernicious effects on 
citizens. In the case of HIV/AIDS, privacy violations had grave consequences for infected 
individuals, and ultimately discouraged many from seeking vital care. Though COVID-19 may 
not carry the same stigma as HIV/AIDS, the protection of privacy is still fundamental, especially 
in countries that are implementing voluntary tracing and surveillance efforts. Unless people feel 
that their sensitive health and location data will be protected, they will be unlikely to participate 
in such voluntary programs, thus undermining the success of government efforts. The 
anonymization of data through Bluetooth-based tracing apps are a promising example of policy 
measures that ensure both privacy and efficacy. 
Analyzing the disparate responses of countries with different governance systems, 
leadership styles, and attitudes toward privacy reveal possible causes of the varying successes 
and failures of nations faced with COVID-19. Centralized governments with strongman rulers 
are able to quickly enact stringent policy measures, though challenges are likely to arise due to 
the hindered flow of information. On the other hand, democratic governments may struggle to 
enact efficacious yet unpopular policies, but are more likely to respect the privacy of citizens. 
The cases of China and the United Kingdom provide important insight into what factors facilitate 
or impede the ability of nations to respond to pandemics in the future. 
Though the balance between privacy and effective public health measures may be 
precarious, nations can and should strive to find equilibrium. History teaches that pandemics will 
never be a thing of the past; creating norms around the protection of privacy even in the midst of 
health crises is therefore imperative. By employing universal guidelines such as establishing 
transparency of government actions and ensuring reasonable scope and duration of implemented 
measures, nations and their citizens can limit the long-term disruptions that pandemics produce. 
In addition, optimizing the use of technology to both prevent the spread of a disease and protect 
the privacy of users enables rights protections to persist even in the modern world. Singapore’s 
TraceTogether app is a perfect example of how technology can spur both effective public health 
measures and privacy protections. Nonetheless, more should be done to ensure the 
proportionality, necessity, and scientific justification of all implemented policies. As technology 




1 Beaglehole, R., Irwin, A., & Prentice, T. (2003). The World Health Report 2003. The World 
Health Organization. https://www.who.int/whr/2003/en/whr03_en.pdf 
2 Schrag, S. J., Brooks, J. T., Van Beneden, C., Parashar, U. D., Griffin, P. M., Anderson, L. J., 
Bellini, W. J., Benson, R. F., Erdman, D. D., Klimov, A., Ksiazek, T. G., Peret, T. C. T., 
Talkington, D. F., Thacker, W. L., Tondella, M. L., Sampson, J. S., Hightower, A. W., 
21
Miller: A Global Investigation of Privacy Issues in the Age of COVID-19
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
Jessie Miller 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 2 
 Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021  
44 
Nordenberg, D. F., Plikaytis, B. D., … Chamberland, M. E. (2004). SARS Surveillance during 
Emergency Public Health Response, United States, March–July 2003. Emerging Infectious 
Diseases, 10(2), 185–194. https://doi.org/10.3201/eid1002.030752 
3 Ibid 
4 Basrur, S. V., Yaffe, B., & Henry, B. (2004). SARS: A Local Public Health Perspective. 
Canadian Journal of Public Health = Revue Canadienne de Santé Publique, 95(1), 22–24. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03403628 
5 Ibid. 
6 Teo, P., Yeoh, B. S. A., & Ong, S. N. (2005). SARS in Singapore: Surveillance strategies in a 
globalising city. Health Policy (Amsterdam, Netherlands), 72(3), 279–291. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2004.11.004 
7 Bowen, J. T., & Laroe, C. (2006). Airline networks and the international diffusion of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). The Geographical Journal, 172(2), 130–144. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4959.2006.00196.x 
8 Chan, E., & Schloenhardt, A. (2004). The 2003 Sars Outbreak In Hong Kong: A Review Of 
Legislative And Border Control Measures. Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 484–510. 
JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24869491 
9 Jacobs, L. A. (2007). Rights and Quarantine during the SARS Global Health Crisis: 
Differentiated Legal Consciousness in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Toronto. Law & Society 
Review, 41(3), 511–551. JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4623394 
10 Ibid. 
11Anderson, T. (2013). HIV/AIDS in Cuba: A rights-based analysis. Health and Human Rights 
Journal. https://www.hhrjournal.org/2013/09/hivaids-in-cuba-a-rights-based-analysis/ 
12 Ibid. 
13 Patrick, D. M., Rekart, M. L., Cook, D., Strathdee, S. A., Spencer, D., & Rees, A. D. (1999). 
Non-Nominal HIV Surveillance: Preserving Privacy While Tracking an Epidemic. Canadian 
Journal of Public Health, 90(3), 164–167. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03404499 
14 Evaluation of HIV Case Surveillance Through the Use of Non-Name Unique Identifiers—
Maryland and Texas. (1994). Centers for Disease Control. 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00050807.htm 
15 Patrick, D. M., Rekart, M. L., Cook, D., Strathdee, S. A., Spencer, D., & Rees, A. D. (1999). 
Non-Nominal HIV Surveillance: Preserving Privacy While Tracking an Epidemic. Canadian 
Journal of Public Health, 90(3), 164–167. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03404499 
16 Evaluation of HIV Case Surveillance Through the Use of Non-Name Unique Identifiers—
Maryland and Texas. (1994). Centers for Disease Control. 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00050807.htm 
17 Bayer, R., & Fairchild, A. (2002). The Limits of Privacy: Surveillance and the Control of 
Disease. Health Care Analysis : HCA : Journal of Health Philosophy and Policy, 10, 19–35. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015698411824 
18 Evaluation of HIV Case Surveillance Through the Use of Non-Name Unique Identifiers—
Maryland and Texas. (1994). Centers for Disease Control. 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00050807.htm 
19 Bayer, R., & Fairchild, A. (2002). The Limits of Privacy: Surveillance and the Control of 




Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss3/2
Tracking the Tracing 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 2 
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021 
45 
21 Fairchild, A. L., & Bayer, R. (2012). Unlinked Anonymous Testing for HIV in Developing 
Countries: A New Ethical Consensus. Public Health Reports, 127(1), 115–118. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3234388/  
22 Ibid. 
23 Chen, L. C. (1987). The AIDS Pandemic: An Internationalist Approach to Disease Control. 
Daedalus, 116(2), 181–195. JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20025102 
24 Doughty, R. (1994). The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information: Responding to the 
Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic. California Law 
Review, 82(1), 111–184. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/3480851 
25 Mydans, S. (1991, July 30). Names List Leads to Ethics Debate. The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/30/us/names-list-leads-to-ethics-debate.html 
26 Doughty, R. (1994). The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information: Responding to the 
Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic. California Law 
Review, 82(1), 111–184. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/3480851 
27 Ibid. 
28 Shereen, M. A., Khan, S., Kazmi, A., Bashir, N., & Siddique, R. (2020). COVID-19 infection: 
Origin, transmission, and characteristics of human coronaviruses. Journal of Advanced Research, 
24, 91–98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jare.2020.03.005 
29 Cho, H., Ippolito, D., & Yu, Y. W. (2020). Contact Tracing Mobile Apps for COVID-19: 
Privacy Considerations and Related Trade-offs. http://arxiv.org/abs/2003.11511 
30 Simko, L., Calo, R., Roesner, F., & Kohno, T. (2020). COVID-19 Contact Tracing and 
Privacy: Studying Opinion and Preferences. University of Washington. 
http://arxiv.org/abs/2005.06056 
31 Ienca, M., & Vayena, E. (2020). On the responsible use of digital data to tackle the COVID-19 
pandemic. Nature Medicine, 26(4), 463–464. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0832-5 
32 Duri, J., Zúñiga, N., Granjo, A., Jenkins, M., Khaghaghordyan, A., Kukutschka, R., . . . 
Rougier, J. (2018). Getting Ahead Of The Curve: Exploring Post-Covid-19 Trends And Their 
Impact On Anti-Corruption, Governance And Development (pp. 9-11, Rep.) (Vrushi J. & Chêne 
M., Eds.). Transparency International. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24924.5 
33 Simko et al., “COVID-19 Contact Tracing and Privacy.” 
34 Ibid. 
35 Duri, J., Zúñiga, N., Granjo, A., Jenkins, M., Khaghaghordyan, A., Kukutschka, R., . . . 
Rougier, J. (2018). Getting Ahead Of The Curve: Exploring Post-Covid-19 Trends And Their 
Impact On Anti-Corruption, Governance And Development (pp. 9-11, Rep.) (Vrushi J. & Chêne 
M., Eds.). Transparency International. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24924.5 
36 Van de Pas, R. (2020). Globalization Paradox and the Coronavirus pandemic (Clingendael 
Report). Netherlands Institute of International Relations. 
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/globalization-paradox-and-coronavirus-pandemic 
37 Swaine, M. D. (2012). America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First 
Century. Brookings Institution Press. https://muse.jhu.edu/book/30595 
38 Liu, W., Yue, X.-G., & Tchounwou, P. B. (2020). Response to the COVID-19 Epidemic: The 
Chinese Experience and Implications for Other Countries. International Journal of 
Environmental Research and Public Health, 17(7). https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17072304 
39 Tian, H., Liu, Y., Li, Y., Wu, C.-H., Chen, B., Kraemer, M. U. G., Li, B., Cai, J., Xu, B., 
Yang, Q., Wang, B., Yang, P., Cui, Y., Song, Y., Zheng, P., Wang, Q., Bjornstad, O. N., Yang, 
R., Grenfell, B. T., … Dye, C. (2020). An investigation of transmission control measures during 
23
Miller: A Global Investigation of Privacy Issues in the Age of COVID-19
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
Jessie Miller 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 2 
 Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021  
46 
the first 50 days of the COVID-19 epidemic in China. Science, 368(6491), 638–642. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abb6105 
40 Van de Pas, R. (2020). Globalization Paradox and the Coronavirus pandemic (Clingendael 
Report). Netherlands Institute of International Relations. 
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/globalization-paradox-and-coronavirus-pandemic 
41 Mozur, P., Zhong, R., & Krolik, A. (2020, March 1). In Coronavirus Fight, China Gives 
Citizens a Color Code, With Red Flags. New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/china-coronavirus-surveillance.html 
42 Klimburg, D. A., Faesen, L., Verhagen, P., & Mirtl, P. (2020). Pandemic Mitigation in the 
Digital Age. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies & The Austrian Institute for European and 
Security Policy. https://hcss.nl/report/pandemic-mitigation-digital-age 
43 Ibid. 
44 Tian, H., Liu, Y., Li, Y., Wu, C.-H., Chen, B., Kraemer, M. U. G., Li, B., Cai, J., Xu, B., 
Yang, Q., Wang, B., Yang, P., Cui, Y., Song, Y., Zheng, P., Wang, Q., Bjornstad, O. N., Yang, 
R., Grenfell, B. T., … Dye, C. (2020). An investigation of transmission control measures during 
the first 50 days of the COVID-19 epidemic in China. Science, 368(6491), 638–642. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abb6105 
45 Ibid. 
46 Bi, Q., Wu, Y., Mei, S., Ye, C., Zou, X., Zhang, Z., Liu, X., Wei, L., Truelove, S. A., Zhang, 
T., Gao, W., Cheng, C., Tang, X., Wu, X., Wu, Y., Sun, B., Huang, S., Sun, Y., Zhang, J., … 
Feng, T. (2020). Epidemiology and transmission of COVID-19 in 391 cases and 1286 of their 
close contacts in Shenzhen, China: A retrospective cohort study. The Lancet Infectious Diseases, 
20(8), 911–919. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30287-5 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Van de Pas, R. (2020). Globalization Paradox and the Coronavirus pandemic (Clingendael 
Report). Netherlands Institute of International Relations. 
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/globalization-paradox-and-coronavirus-pandemic 
50 Mozur, P., Zhong, R., & Krolik, A. (2020, March 1). In Coronavirus Fight, China Gives 
Citizens a Color Code, With Red Flags. New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/china-coronavirus-surveillance.html 
51 Yuan, S. (2020, March 1). How China is using AI and big data to fight the coronavirus. Al 
Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/china-ai-big-data-combat-coronavirus-
outbreak-200301063901951.html 
52 Van de Pas, R. (2020). Globalization Paradox and the Coronavirus pandemic (Clingendael 
Report). Netherlands Institute of International Relations. 
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/globalization-paradox-and-coronavirus-pandemic 
53 Mozur, P., Zhong, R., & Krolik, A. (2020, March 1). In Coronavirus Fight, China Gives 
Citizens a Color Code, With Red Flags. New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/china-coronavirus-surveillance.html 
54 Ibid. 
55 Emerging COVID-19 success story: South Korea learned the lessons of MERS. (2020, June 
30). Our World In Data. https://ourworldindata.org/covid-exemplar-south-korea” 
56 Watson, I., & Jeong, S. (2020, February 28). Coronavirus mobile apps are surging in 
popularity in South Korea. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/28/tech/korea-coronavirus-
tracking-apps/index.html 
24
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss3/2
Tracking the Tracing 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 2 
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021 
47 
57 Klimburg, D. A., Faesen, L., Verhagen, P., & Mirtl, P. (2020). Pandemic Mitigation in the 
Digital Age. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies & The Austrian Institute for European and 
Security Policy. https://hcss.nl/report/pandemic-mitigation-digital-age 
58 Ibid.  
59 https://coronamap.site/ 
60 Klimburg, D. A., Faesen, L., Verhagen, P., & Mirtl, P. (2020). Pandemic Mitigation in the 
Digital Age. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies & The Austrian Institute for European and 
Security Policy. https://hcss.nl/report/pandemic-mitigation-digital-age 
61 Ibid.  
62 Park, S., Choi, G. J., & Ko, H. (2020). Information Technology-Based Tracing Strategy in 
Response to COVID-19 in South Korea-Privacy Controversies. JAMA. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.6602 
63 Emerging COVID-19 success story: South Korea learned the lessons of MERS. (2020, June 
30). Our World In Data. https://ourworldindata.org/covid-exemplar-south-korea” 
64 Lu, N., Cheng, K.-W., Qamar, N., Huang, K.-C., & Johnson, J. A. (2020). Weathering 
COVID-19 storm: Successful control measures of five Asian countries. American Journal of 
Infection Control, 48(7), 851–852. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajic.2020.04.021 
65 Ibid. 
66 Park, S., Choi, G. J., & Ko, H. (2020). Information Technology-Based Tracing Strategy in 
Response to COVID-19 in South Korea-Privacy Controversies. JAMA. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.6602 
67 Klimburg, D. A., Faesen, L., Verhagen, P., & Mirtl, P. (2020). Pandemic Mitigation in the 
Digital Age. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies & The Austrian Institute for European and 
Security Policy. https://hcss.nl/report/pandemic-mitigation-digital-age 
68 Park, S., Choi, G. J., & Ko, H. (2020). Information Technology-Based Tracing Strategy in 
Response to COVID-19 in South Korea-Privacy Controversies. JAMA. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.6602 
69 Ibid. 
70 Cox, D. (2020). Alarm bells ring for patient data and privacy in the covid-19 goldrush. BMJ. 
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m1925 
71 Emerging COVID-19 success story: South Korea learned the lessons of MERS. (2020, June 
30). Our World In Data. https://ourworldindata.org/covid-exemplar-south-korea” 
72 Park, S., Choi, G. J., & Ko, H. (2020). Information Technology-Based Tracing Strategy in 
Response to COVID-19 in South Korea-Privacy Controversies. JAMA. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.6602 
73 Klimburg, D. A., Faesen, L., Verhagen, P., & Mirtl, P. (2020). Pandemic Mitigation in the 
Digital Age. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies & The Austrian Institute for European and 
Security Policy. https://hcss.nl/report/pandemic-mitigation-digital-age 
74 Ibid.  
75 Van de Pas, R. (2020). Globalization Paradox and the Coronavirus pandemic (Clingendael 
Report). Netherlands Institute of International Relations. 
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/globalization-paradox-and-coronavirus-pandemic 
76 https://www.tracetogether.gov.sg/ 
77 Statistics Singapore—Population and Households. (n.d.). Department of Statistics Singapore. 
Retrieved August 23, 2020, from https://www.singstat.gov.sg/publications/reference/singapore-
in-figures/population-and-households 
25
Miller: A Global Investigation of Privacy Issues in the Age of COVID-19
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
Jessie Miller 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 2 
 Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021  
48 
78 Kuguyo, O., Kengne, A. P., & Dandara, C. (2020). Singapore COVID-19 Pandemic Response 
as a Successful Model Framework for Low-Resource Health Care Settings in Africa? OMICS: A 
Journal of Integrative Biology, 24(8), 470–478. https://doi.org/10.1089/omi.2020.0077 
79 Cho, H., Ippolito, D., & Yu, Y. W. (2020). Contact Tracing Mobile Apps for COVID-19: 
Privacy Considerations and Related Trade-offs. http://arxiv.org/abs/2003.11511 
80 Ibid. 
81 Klonowska, K., & Bindt, P. (2020). The COVID-19 pandemic: Two waves of technological 





85 Sabat, I., Neuman-Böhme, S., Varghese, N. E., Barros, P. P., Brouwer, W., van Exel, J., 
Schreyögg, J., & Stargardt, T. (2020). United but divided: Policy responses and people’s 
perceptions in the EU during the COVID-19 outbreak. Health Policy. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2020.06.009 
86 Van Kolfschooten, H., & de Ruijter, A. (2020). COVID-19 and privacy in the European 




89 Klonowska, K., & Bindt, P. (2020). The COVID-19 pandemic: Two waves of technological 





93 Ibid.  
94 Sabat, I., Neuman-Böhme, S., Varghese, N. E., Barros, P. P., Brouwer, W., van Exel, J., 
Schreyögg, J., & Stargardt, T. (2020). United but divided: Policy responses and people’s 
perceptions in the EU during the COVID-19 outbreak. Health Policy. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2020.06.009 
95 Ibid. 
96 Klonowska, K., & Bindt, P. (2020). The COVID-19 pandemic: Two waves of technological 
responses in the European Union. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies; JSTOR. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep24004 
97 Ibid. 
98 Van Kolfschooten, H., & de Ruijter, A. (2020). COVID-19 and privacy in the European 
Union: A legal perspective on contact tracing. Contempora 
99 Landman, K. (2020, June 28). Hey America, What Happened to Contact Tracing? 
https://elemental.medium.com/hey-america-what-happened-to-contact-tracing-47a2dbccc020 
100 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html 
101 Aschwanden, C. (2020). Contact Tracing, a Key Way to Slow COVID-19, Is Badly 
Underused by the U.S. Scientific American. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/contact-
tracing-a-key-way-to-slow-covid-19-is-badly-underused-by-the-u-s/ 
26
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss3/2
Tracking the Tracing 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 2 
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021 
49 
102 Cha, V. (2020). Asia’s COVID-19 Lessons for the West: Public Goods, Privacy, and Social 
Tagging. The Washington Quarterly, 43(2), 1–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1770959 
103 Pentland, A. (2020). Restarting the Economy and Avoiding Big Brother: MIT Initiative on the 
Digital Economy. http://ide.mit.edu/publications/restarting-economy-and-avoiding-big-brother. 
104 Cha, V. (2020). Asia’s COVID-19 Lessons for the West: Public Goods, Privacy, and Social 
Tagging. The Washington Quarterly, 43(2), 1–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1770959 
105 Maor, M., Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R., & Chinitz, D. (2020). When COVID-19, constitutional 
crisis, and political deadlock meet: The Israeli case from a disproportionate policy perspective. 
Policy and Society, 39(3), 442–457. https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2020.1783792 
106 Klimburg, D. A., Faesen, L., Verhagen, P., & Mirtl, P. (2020). Pandemic Mitigation in the 
Digital Age. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies & The Austrian Institute for European and 
Security Policy. https://hcss.nl/report/pandemic-mitigation-digital-age 
107 Ibid 
108 Hershkowitz, T. S. A. and R. A. (2020, July 6). How Israel’s COVID-19 mass surveillance 
operation works. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-israels-covid-19-mass-
surveillance-operation-works/ 
109 Klimburg, D. A., Faesen, L., Verhagen, P., & Mirtl, P. (2020). Pandemic Mitigation in the 
Digital Age. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies & The Austrian Institute for European and 
Security Policy. https://hcss.nl/report/pandemic-mitigation-digital-age 
110  Hershkowitz, T. S. A. and R. A. (2020, July 6). How Israel’s COVID-19 mass surveillance 
operation works. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-israels-covid-19-mass-
surveillance-operation-works/ 
111 Chachko, Elena. (2020, May 5). The Israeli Supreme Court Checks COVID-19 Electronic 
Surveillance. Lawfare. https://www.lawfareblog.com/israeli-supreme-court-checks-covid-19-
electronic-surveillance 
112 Hershkowitz, T. S. A. and R. A. (2020, July 6). How Israel’s COVID-19 mass surveillance 
operation works. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-israels-covid-19-mass-
surveillance-operation-works/ 
113 Schulman, M. (2020, July 21). Sudden implosion of Israel’s COVID response might prove 
Netanyahu’s undoing. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/netanyahu-covid-response-israel-
chaos-1519456 
114 Murray, C. (2020, July 15). Israel’s second coronavirus wave is threatening Netanyahu’s hold 




117 Schulman, M. (2020, July 21). Sudden implosion of Israel’s COVID response might prove 
Netanyahu’s undoing. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/netanyahu-covid-response-israel-
chaos-1519456 
118 Murray, C. (2020, July 15). Israel’s second coronavirus wave is threatening Netanyahu’s hold 
on power. Vox. https://www.vox.com/2020/7/15/21326028/israel-netanyahu-coronavirus-covid-
19 
27
Miller: A Global Investigation of Privacy Issues in the Age of COVID-19
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
Jessie Miller 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 2 
 Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021  
50 
119  Hershkowitz, T. S. A. and R. A. (2020, July 6). How Israel’s COVID-19 mass surveillance 




122 Israel’s coronavirus surveillance is an example for others—Of what not to do. (2020, May 1). 
Privacy International. https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3747/israels-coronavirus-
surveillance-example-others-what-not-do 
123 Hershkowitz, T. S. A. and R. A. (2020, July 6). How Israel’s COVID-19 mass surveillance 
operation works. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-israels-covid-19-mass-
surveillance-operation-works/ 
124 Yarmosky, J. (2020, August 17). How Taiwan is battling coronavirus with tech, 
crowdsourced data and trust. The World. https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-08-17/how-taiwan-
battling-coronavirus-tech-crowdsourced-data-and-trust 
125 Klimburg, D. A., Faesen, L., Verhagen, P., & Mirtl, P. (2020). Pandemic Mitigation in the 
Digital Age. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies & The Austrian Institute for European and 
Security Policy. https://hcss.nl/report/pandemic-mitigation-digital-age 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Wang, C. J., Ng, C. Y., & Brook, R. H. (2020). Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan: Big Data 
Analytics, New Technology, and Proactive Testing. JAMA, 323(14), 1341–1342. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.3151 
129 Steinbrook, R. (2020). Contact Tracing, Testing, and Control of COVID-19—Learning From 
Taiwan. JAMA Internal Medicine. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2020.2072 
130 Cheng, H.-Y., Jian, S.-W., Liu, D.-P., Ng, T.-C., Huang, W.-T., & Lin, H.-H. (2020). Contact 
Tracing Assessment of COVID-19 Transmission Dynamics in Taiwan and Risk at Different 
Exposure Periods Before and After Symptom Onset. JAMA Internal Medicine. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2020.2020 
131 Yarmosky, J. (2020, August 17). How Taiwan is battling coronavirus with tech, 
crowdsourced data and trust. The World. https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-08-17/how-taiwan-
battling-coronavirus-tech-crowdsourced-data-and-trust 
132 Duff-Brown, B. (2020, March 3). How Taiwan Used Big Data, Transparency and a Central 
Command to Protect Its People from Coronavirus. Stanford Health Policy. 
https://healthpolicy.fsi.stanford.edu/news/how-taiwan-used-big-data-transparency-central-
command-protect-its-people-coronavirus 
133 Yarmosky, J. (2020, August 17). How Taiwan is battling coronavirus with tech, 
crowdsourced data and trust. The World. https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-08-17/how-taiwan-
battling-coronavirus-tech-crowdsourced-data-and-trust 
134 Lanier, J., & Weyl, E. G. (2020, April 10). How Civic Technology Can Help Stop a 
Pandemic. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2020-03-20/how-civic-
technology-can-help-stop-pandemic 
135 Ibid. 
136 Yarmosky, J. (2020, August 17). How Taiwan is battling coronavirus with tech, 
crowdsourced data and trust. The World. https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-08-17/how-taiwan-
battling-coronavirus-tech-crowdsourced-data-and-trust 
28
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss3/2
Tracking the Tracing 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 2 
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021 
51 
137 Wang, C. J., Ng, C. Y., & Brook, R. H. (2020). Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan: Big Data 
Analytics, New Technology, and Proactive Testing. JAMA, 323(14), 1341–1342. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.3151 




140 Stancati, M. (2020, August 13). Rising Coronavirus Infections Trigger Renewed Travel 
Restrictions Across Europe. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/rising-
coronavirus-infections-restrict-european-holidaymakers-11597326586 
141 Klonowska, K., & Bindt, P. (2020). The COVID-19 pandemic: Two waves of technological 
responses in the European Union. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies; JSTOR. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep24004 
142 Ibid. 
143 Lanier, J., & Weyl, E. G. (2020, April 10). How Civic Technology Can Help Stop a 
Pandemic. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2020-03-20/how-civic-
technology-can-help-stop-pandemic 
144 Watson, I., & Jeong, S. (2020, February 28). Coronavirus mobile apps are surging in 
popularity in South Korea. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/28/tech/korea-coronavirus-
tracking-apps/index.html 
145 Mozur, P., Zhong, R., & Krolik, A. (2020, March 1). In Coronavirus Fight, China Gives 
Citizens a Color Code, With Red Flags. New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/china-coronavirus-surveillance.html 
146 Pei, M. (2020, July 17). China’s Coming Upheaval. Foreign Affairs. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-03/chinas-coming-upheaval 
147 Cyranoski, D. (2020). What China’s coronavirus response can teach the rest of the world. 
Nature, 579(7800), 479–480. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-020-00741-x 




150 Macaskill, Andrew. (2020, November 24). 50,000 COVID-19 deaths and rising. How the UK 
keeps failing. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/health-coronavirus-
britain-newwave/ 




153 Gugushvili, A., Koltai, J., Stuckler, D., & McKee, M. (2020). Votes, populism, and 
pandemics. International Journal of Public Health, 65(6), 721–722. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00038-020-01450-y 
154 Ibid 




Miller: A Global Investigation of Privacy Issues in the Age of COVID-19
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
Jessie Miller 
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 2 
 Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021  
52 
156 McGee, L. (2020, October 13). Analysis: Boris Johnson has split from his top scientists on 
coronavirus. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/13/uk/boris-johnson-versus-scientific-advice-
intl-gbr/index.html 
157 Macaskill, Andrew. (2020, November 24). 50,000 COVID-19 deaths and rising. How the UK 
keeps failing. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/health-coronavirus-
britain-newwave/ 
158 Ibid. 




161 Is China winning? (2020, April 16). The Economist. 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/04/16/is-china-winning 
162 Hart, V., Siddarth, D., Cantrell, B., & Tretikov, L. (n.d.). Outpacing the Virus: Digital 
Response to Containing the Spread of COVID-19 while Mitigating Privacy Risks. Retrieved 
August 23, 2020, from https://ethics.harvard.edu/outpacing-virus 
163 Ibid 
164 Ienca, M., & Vayena, E. (2020). On the responsible use of digital data to tackle the COVID-
19 pandemic. Nature Medicine, 26(4), 463–464. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0832-5 
165 Tracking and tracing COVID: Protecting privacy and data while using apps and biometrics. 






Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2018], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss3/2
